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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND 
STATEMENT OF FACTS CONTAINS ERRONEOUS 
FACTUAL ASSERTIONS. 
The appellee does not challenge the appellant, Harrington 
Trucking's, statement of the case or statement of facts in her 
brief. However, appellee proffers her own statement of the 
case and statement of the facts which contains substantial and 
relevant erroneous assertions. What follows is Harrington 
Trucking's response and correction of appellee's erroneous 
factual assertions. 
1. On pages 3 and 4 of her brief, appellee states that 
"that at the September 18, 1998, [sic] hearing on those 
matters, Harrington acknowledged that it had not filed an 
answer." This assertion is not supported by the record. The 
September 18, 1998 hearing contains no reference by any party, 
including counsel for Harrington Trucking, to the answer filed 
on April 7, 1998. (R. 294, pp. 1-30.) Therefore, counsel for 
1 
Harrington Trucking did not '"acknowledge" that it had failed 
to file an answer. 
2. On page 4 of her brief, appellee asserts that 
"Harrington conducted no formal discovery in this case." 
Again, Harrington's statement is directly controverted by the 
record in this case. Attached to Harrington's reply 
memorandum in support of its motion to set aside default 
judgment or declaration of common law marriage, Harrington 
Trucking attached several exhibits which included subpoenas it 
had issued as well as letters in an attempt to conduct 
informal discovery through appellee's counsel. (R. 160-235.) 
Therefore, the record clearly shows that Harrington Trucking 
conducted both formal and informal discovery in an attempt to 
resolve this matter despite appellee's assertions to the 
contrary. (Id.) 
3. Nowhere in appellee's statement of the case does she 
mention that Harrington Trucking's motion to set aside the 
default judgment was initially granted by Commissioner Arnett 
who was familiar with the case. The same day the Commissioner 
2 
granted Harrington Trucking's motion to set aside the default 
judgment, Judge Maughan, who was sitting on the case for the 
first time, overruled the Commissioner's report and 
recommendation. Judge Maughan simply did not have the time to 
become familiar with the facts of the case in order to make a 
proper ruling, 
4. On page 6 of appellee's brief at paragraph 4, 
appellee asserts that uno answer controverting the allegations 
of [appellee's] petition was ever filed." This statement of 
"fact" is the main issue in this case was before this Court 
and therefore cannot be a fact. It is for this Court to 
decide whether or not any answer was filed on April 7, 1998 
which precluded the court from entering a default judgment in 
this matter. 
5. On pages 6 and 7 of appellee's brief at paragraph 9, 
appellee fails to quote the entire text of Harrington 
Trucking's answer filed on April 7, 1998. The entire text of 
the answer is as follows: 
3 
COMES NOW Harrington Trucking and 
objects to the petition for judicial 
declaration of common law marriage filed in 
this matter by Janet Robins Mitchell. 
The basis for this objection is found 
in the motion to intervene and the 
accompanying memoranda filed by movant 
Harrington Trucking and upon the basis that 
the facts and affidavits submitted by 
petitioner are insufficient to satisfy the 
requirements of Utah Code Annot. § 31-1-
4.5. 
(R. 55-57.) (Emphasis added. Underlined portions were not 
quoted by appellee.) 
6. On page 7 of appellee's brief at paragraph 10, 
appellee asserts that "neither the intervention memorandum nor 
the objection contest any allegation of [appellee's] 
petition." Again, this is not what the record reflects. (R. 
55-90.) The objection was in the form of a general denial as 
specifically allowed under Rule 8 (b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Harrington Trucking objected to all of 
appellee's allegations in her petition. (Id.) 
7. On page 7, paragraph 12, appellee's counsel argues 
that he was unaware of any answer being on file at the 
4 
September 18, 1998 hearing and therefore an answer was 
necessary in order to put him on notice of what claims would 
be contested by Harrington Trucking. However, appellee's 
counsel's ignorance of the general objection filed on April 
17, 1998 is irrelevant to this case. The answer containing a 
general objection was on file. Harrington Trucking challenged 
all of the allegations in appellee's petition on April 7, 
1998. (R. 55-57.) Even if appellee's counsel did not know 
about the answer, an answer was on file. That is all that is 
required under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
8 On page 9 of appellee's brief at paragraph 23, 
appellee asserts that "even though earlier dates were 
available, Harrington Trucking scheduled its motion to set 
aside for hearing on December 16, 1998." This statement of 
fact is misleading because the record reflects Harrington 
Trucking's counsel did every thing in his power to expedite a 
hearing date on this issue. The records states as follows: 
I'd like to back up a little bit and 
talk about what happened when we filed our 
motion to set aside. I personally brought 
5 
that motion here to the court. I 
personally filed it with the clerk. I 
personally took copies and brought them to 
Judge Stirba. Judge Stirba, at that time, 
had already left due to her incapacity. I 
talked to her clerk. Her clerk informed me 
that it was being sent down to Commissioner 
Arnett. I said, Why, you know, shouldn't 
this be heard before a Judge? She said, 
No, I believe this should go down to 
Commissioner Arnett. He has the file, I 
don't have it anymore, you can't give me 
anything. 
I walked to Commissioner Arnett's 
office. I filed a courtesy copy with 
Commissioner Arnett of the motion to set 
aside default. I looked at his calendar. 
Initially, there was a date on December 
4th of this year, but that was the first 
one. So, again, that's after November 
12th. However, there was scheduling 
difficulty and I had to click it back to 
December 16th. But, again, I did it as 
soon as I could because I realized that we 
needed to get this resolved as soon as 
possible. I was not - and I can say this 
based on my own personal knowledge of what 
I actually did. I did it as quickly as I 
could. 
(R. 294, pp. 19-20.) 
9. On page 10, paragraph 25, appellee states, 
"Harrington does not argue that the lower court's finding of 
6 
prejudice to [appellee] was in error." Although technically 
true, the statement is misleading because it presupposes that 
Harrington Trucking had a duty to raise the issue of prejudice 
in its initial brief. Harrington Trucking does not have the 
duty to make appellee's arguments for her. Appellee has now 
raised the issued of prejudice and Harrington Trucking will 
respond to the issue of prejudice. 
POINT II. 
BECAUSE THERE WAS AN ANSWER ON FILE, THE 
TRIAL COURT'S ENTERING OF A DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT WAS AB INITIO INVALID. 
Appellee does not contest the fact that a responsive 
pleading was on file on April 7, 1998. Rather, appellee 
attempts to characterize this pleading as not an answer. In 
support of her argument, appellee cites Black7s Law Dictionary 
and a section from Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure claiming that Utah case law on what constitutes an 
answer is "sparse". However, there are several Utah cases 
discussing the interpretation of pleadings generally and 
answers specifically. 
7 
The general rule regarding interpretations of pleadings 
like answers is embodied in Rule 8(f) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure which states, "All pleadings shall be 
construed as to do substantial justice." 
Pursuant to this general principle, a great deal of case 
law has grown up around the proposition that pleadings like 
answers should be liberally construed. As early as 1932, the 
Utah Supreme Court held that an answer should be construed 
liberally and supported by every legal intendment. Escalante 
Co. v. Kent, 7 P. 2d 276 (Utah 1932) . The liberal construction 
rule has also been applied to complaints. In Debry v. Noble, 
889 P.2d 428 (Utah 1985), the Supreme Court held that 
allegations in a complaint should be construed liberally. 
This liberal construction rule is the bedrock upon which any 
court should build its interpretation of an answer. 
The answer filed by Harrington Trucking was in the form 
of a general denial. Harrington Trucking's answer filed on 
April 7, 1998 states in pertinent part: 
8 
Comes now Harrington Trucking and 
objects to the petition for judicial 
declaration of common law marriage filed in 
this matter by Janet Robbins Mitchell. 
(R. 55-57.) 
General denials of this form are specifically allowed by 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure states in pertinent part: 
A party shall state in short and plain 
terms his defenses to each claim asserted 
and shall admit or deny the averments upon 
which they adverse party relies. ... He 
may make his denials as specific denials of 
designated averments or paragraphs or he 
may generally deny all the averments. 
(Emphasis added.) 
In the case of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. 
Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1374 (Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme 
Court discussed at length the rules applicable to general 
denials. The Supreme Court stated: 
Under modern pleading rules, the scope 
of a general denial is very broad. We held 
in Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 2 05, 211, 
381 P. 2d 86, 91 (1963) , and have reiterated 
on numerous occasions since that although 
rule 8(c) is valuable for assuring that the 
issues to be tried clearly framed, it is 
9 
not the only rule in the book of Rules 
of Civil Procedure. They must all be 
looked to in light of their even more 
fundamental purpose of liberalizing 
both pleading and procedure to the end 
that the parties are afforded the 
privilege of presenting whatever 
legitimate contentions they have 
pertaining to their dispute. 
Thus our interpretation of the pleading 
rules must turn upon the fact that u[w]hat 
[the parties] are entitled to is notice of 
the issues raised and an opportunity to 
meet them." When this is accomplished, 
that is all that is required. 
Therefore, the issue is whether the answer was adequate 
to put appellee on notice of the parts of her petition which 
would be contested by Harrington Trucking. The general denial 
clearly indicates that all of appellee's contentions contained 
in her petition may have been challenged by Harrington 
Trucking. This put appellee on notice that she needed to 
prepare to prove all of her claims in her petition. That is 
all that is required under the law. 
10 
A. Even Assuming that the Objection is Construed as a 
12(b) (6) Motion, the Trial Court Could Not Enter Default Under 
the Rules; Therefore, Harrington Trucking's Motion to Set 
Aside the Default Judgment Should Have Been Granted, 
Appellee argues that the answer filed on April 7,1998 
should be construed as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Therefore, she 
reasons, the entry of default judgment was really a denial of 
the Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Appellee then takes a final leap 
beyond reason and states that default was properly entered. 
This argument is without merit. Appellee ignores the 
requirement of proper notice and hearing on the alleged Rule 
12(b)(6) motion. However, even ignoring these obvious 
problems with appellee's arguments, the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure clearly indicated that even if the entry of default 
judgment were a denial of the alleged 12(b)(6) motion, 
Harrington Trucking would have had ten days to file an answer. 
Rule 12(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
If the court denies the motion or postpones 
its disposition until the trial on the 
merits, the responsive pleading shall be 
served within ten days after notice of the 
court's action. (Emphasis added.) 
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In this case, the trial court entered default judgment on 
October 28, 1998. Even assuming that Harrington Trucking 
received notice that same day, Harrington Trucking would have 
ten days to file an answer. Even appellee admits that 
Harrington Trucking did in fact file an additional answer on 
October 28, 1998, well within the ten-day required period to 
file an answer following the denial of a motion to dismiss. 
Therefore, under any set of circumstances (either an 
answer was on file, or the answer was really a 12(b) (6) motion 
which was denied on October 28, 1998, followed by the filing 
of a second answer on the same day), appellee's arguments fail 
as a matter of law. Under either set of circumstances, there 
was an appropriate answer on file. Therefore, under Rule 55 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court could 
not enter a default judgment. Because the trial court could 
not enter a default judgment, the trial court erred, as a 
matter of law, by failing to set aside the default judgment at 
a later date when given the opportunity to do so. 
12 
POINT III. 
ANY PREJUDICE TO APPELLEE IN THIS CASE WAS 
DUE TO APPELLEE'S DECISION TO FILE A 
MERITLESS DEFAULT CERTIFICATE AND NOT TO 
ANY ACTION OF HARRINGTON TRUCKING. 
Appellee argues that she has been "prejudiced" by the 
actions of Harrington Trucking. However, it is not the 
actions of Harrington Trucking which have caused her 
prejudice, if any, but rather her decision to pursue a 
meritless default judgment. 
On October 28, 1998, appellee was presented with a 
choice. She could either go ahead and have an evidentiary 
hearing on her petition for common law marriage which was 
scheduled to be heard on November 12, 1998, or she could 
attempt to avoid a hearing on the merits by filing a default 
certificate. She knew or should have known that the latter 
course would be risky in that a responsive pleading was on 
file since April 7, 1998. However, for reasons unknown, 
appellee decided to gamble on the latter course instead of 
having a trial on the merits. It is unclear why appellee 
13 
wished to avoid a trial on the merits, but she attempted to 
use a procedural argument to avoid a determination on the 
merits. 
If, in the end, her strategy results in damage to her 
claim, she can certainly not blame Harrington Trucking. 
Harrington Trucking acted in good faith to complete discovery 
in time for the evidentiary hearing. To now claim "prejudice" 
due to her tactical decision is difficult to understand. 
Appellee could have avoided this problem by simply going 
forward with the evidentiary hearing. She choose not to do so 
and instead chose a risky path. When a party harms its own 
case by its own actions, it cannot claim prejudice due to 
those actions. See, Adams v. Board of Review of Industrial 
Commission, 821 P. 2d 1, 7 (Utah App. 1991) (holding that when 
considering an error that is strictly of one party's making, 
the other party cannot be charged for that error); Askew v. 
Hardman, 884 P.2d 1258, 1264 (Utah App. 1994) (dissenting 
opinion) (when the dilemma is largely of one party's making, 
the other party should not be charged with the error.) 
14 
Harrington Trucking is not responsible for appellee's poor 
choices. 
POINT IV. 
WHETHER OR NOT AN ANSWER WAS FILED IS NOT 
AN ISSUE OF FACT. 
Although appellee contends otherwise, whether the 
pleading filed on April 7, 1998 is an answer is a question of 
law, not of fact. Appellee concedes that there was a pleading 
filed on April 7, 1998. The only issue, then, is whether said 
pleading constitutes an answer. Since the answer is part of 
the record, this Court may determine for itself whether or not 
it was filed on April 7th and the nature of the answer. There 
is no issue of fact regarding this issue. 
POINT V. 
HARRINGTON TRUCKING CAN SEEK RELIEF UNDER 
RULE 60(a). 
Appellee argues that Harrington Trucking's request for 
relief under Rule 60(a) is inappropriate because the issue is 
not raised below. However, appellee's argument ignores the 
issue that was in fact raised below. 
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It was is uncontroverted that Harrington Trucking 
requested the court to set aside the default judgment as there 
was in fact an answer on file in the case. Although counsel 
for Harrington Trucking may have inadvertently termed the 
relief requested as a motion to set aside default judgment 
under Rule 60(b) (and in fact there was a request to set aside 
the default judgment under the excusable neglect portion of 
Rule 60(b)), the actual relief sought by Harrington was relief 
under Rule 60(a) for a clerical mistake. Whether or not there 
was an answer on file when default was entered is really a 
clerical issue. No matter how the counsel for Harrington 
Trucking may have described his request, this Court will look 
past the description of the motion and look to the substance 
of the relief actually requested. In Brown v. David K. 
Richards & Co, 978 P.2d at 470, 477-78 (Utah App. 1999), the 
court stated: 
In determining the nature of a legal 
order or proceeding, we look to the 
substance of the order or proceeding, and 
not its title. See, e.g., Renn v. Utah 
State Bd. of Pardons, 904 P. 2d 677, 681 
16 
(Utah 1995) ("We will look to the substance 
of the action and the nature of the relief 
sought in determining the true nature of 
the extraordinary relief requested."); 
Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431,433 (Utah 
1993) ("On appeal, we disregard the labels 
attached to findings and conclusions and 
look to substance."). 
In this case, the relief actually requested was under 
Rule 60(a). The relief requested was briefed and argued, 
therefore, it was raised below. (R. 160-235.) 
Furthermore, under Rule 60(a), the Appellate Court has 
the ability to correct clerical mistakes. Rule 60(a) states: 
Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or 
other parts of the record and errors 
therein arising from oversight or omission 
may be corrected by the court at any time 
of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as 
the court orders. During the pendency of 
an appeal, such mistakes may be so 
corrected before the appeal is docketed in 
the appellate court, and thereafter while 
the appeal is pending may be so corrected 
with leave of the appellate court. 
(Emphasis added.) 
17 
Therefore, this Court has the power under Rule 60(a) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to correct the error which 
occurred in this case, i.e., the entry of default judgment due 
to the trial court's oversight in failing to recognize that an 
answer had been filed. 
POINT VI. 
HARRINGTON TRUCKING HAS ESTABLISHED THAT IT 
HAS A MERITORIOUS DEFENSE TO THIS ACTION. 
Contrary to appellee's contentions, the trial court and 
the Commissioner agreed that Harrington Trucking has adduced 
evidence which gives it a meritorious defense to this action. 
This evidence was discussed in the hearing before Judge 
Maughan and in the briefs filed with the trial court. (R.160-
235.) Besides the documentary evidence which indicates that 
the appellee did not have a marital relationship with Dennis 
Mitchell as defined under Utah Code Annot., § 30-1-4.5, there 
will be testimony, from some of the people whose affidavits 
have been submitted in this case, that appellee's and Dennis 
18 
Mitchell's relationship was not a marital relationship as 
defined under Utah Code Annot., § 30-1-4.5. 
This is all that is necessary. It is not for this Court 
nor the lower court to weigh the evidence of these issues. 
All that is necessary is that Harrington Trucking do what it 
has done, i.e., present evidence that it has a meritorious 
defense to this action. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, and for the reasons stated 
in Harrington Trucking's prior brief, Harrington Trucking 
respectfully requests this Court to reverse Judge Maughan's 
decision to deny Harrington Trucking's motion to set aside 
default judgment, set aside the default judgment and this 
remand this case for further proceedings below consistent with 
this Court's opinion. 
19 
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